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Documentation Index

Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.binibit.com/llms.txt

Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

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What “trustless agents” means here

Agents in the Hive are not custodial. They cannot:
  • Withdraw user funds
  • Move LP positions
  • Mint or burn tokens beyond the standard sink mechanisms
  • Pause pools
  • Modify Agent Token contracts
Their authority is bounded to specific advisory and governance actions on the agent layer. This bounding is enforced at the contract level — the V3 pool contracts don’t have privileged roles for agents. Workers, Scouts, Queens have no special permissions on user funds.

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The four trust pillars

Trust in the Hive comes from four mechanisms working together:

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1. Hard contract limits

Agents cannot do what isn’t permitted by the contracts themselves. No off-chain “trust me” — just on-chain enforcement.

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2. On-chain action logs

Every decision is permanently recorded. No “the agent said X but did Y” — the log is canonical. See Action Logs.

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3. Hierarchy + override

Every action can be overridden by a higher-tier agent (Queen > Scout > Worker), and every override is also logged. No silent corrections. See Hierarchy.

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4. User governance

Token holders at L20+ vote on Worker parameters. Hive-level decisions go to multisig + governance. Users have direct influence on agent behavior. See Voting.

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What can still go wrong

Trust mechanisms reduce risk, but don’t eliminate it. Realistic risks:
RiskMitigationResidual
Agent code bug causes wrong decisionAction log makes bug visible; Queen override patches behavior; full code audit before mainnetPossible until exhaustively tested
Coordinated agent collusionMulti-tier hierarchy and multisig governance; cross-tier overridesLow probability, hard to fully eliminate
Hive infrastructure compromiseOff-chain components could be attacked but cannot custody funds; degraded mode keeps swaps workingPossible; degrades to “no agents” mode
User vote manipulation (sybil)L20 gate, NFT + holdings weightL20+ sybil farming theoretically possible at very high cost
Queen abuse of overrideMultisig for budget actions; override actions logged with reason; Hive governance can suspend QueensLow — Queens have skin in the game (reputation)

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Why “agent-managed” not “AI-managed”

Choice of language matters:
“AI-managed""Agent-managed”
ImpliesBlack-box LLM with judgmentHierarchical, bounded, logged system
Regulator-comfortableNo (AI advisor on financial decisions = scrutiny)Yes (clear constraints, accountability mechanisms)
User-comfortableVariable — “AI” connotes magic and unaccountabilityHigher — “agent” implies bounded role
Tech-accurateInaccurate (the system isn’t autonomous LLM)Accurate (it IS bounded agents in a hierarchy)
For these reasons, public copy uses “agents” / “hive” / “swarm” / “hive principle” — never “AI” or “LLM”. The implementation may use ML internally (some Scouts may be LLM-powered, some Workers may use heuristic models), but the externally visible system is a bounded multi-agent system, not “AI making decisions”. See Branding rule in plan.

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Public audit and disclosure

Pre-mainnet:
  • Smart contracts audited by independent firm (TBD which)
  • Action log schema published and stable
  • Hive policy parameters published
  • Override logic in code, not behind closed doors
Post-mainnet:
  • Action logs continuously inspectable
  • Quarterly Hive operating reports (governance summary, suspension events, vote outcomes)
  • Public bug bounty program
  • Open-source repository (timing TBD)

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Bug bounty

A bug bounty program will run pre and post mainnet for:
  • Smart contract vulnerabilities (highest reward)
  • Off-chain Hive infrastructure exploits
  • Action log tampering or omission
  • User governance bypass
Specifics will be published when the program launches.

Action logs

On-chain transparency

Hierarchy

Override mechanics

Voting

User governance

BaiDEX Contracts

Where contract limits are enforced